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Abstract

Results

Conclusions

MPEG-DASH is a video streaming standard that outlines protocols for sending
audio and video content from a server to a client over HTTP. However, it creates
an opportunity for an adversary to invade users' privacy. Once a fingerprint is
created, the adversary can use this to identify whether a target user is watching
the corresponding video. We propose a defense against the attack with rigorous
privacy and performance constraints, creating a totally private, scalable solution
that outperforms the extant schemes. Our algorithm, No Data are Alone (NDA),
is based on K-Means clustering. The experimental results show that our scheme
is more than two times as efficient as others. Additionally, no classifier can
achieve an accuracy above 7% against videos obfuscated with our scheme.

The result of our defensive scheme can be seen in the graph below.
This graph is an altered (private) version of the graph shown in the
previous section, Materials and Methods.

This work aimed to develop a privacy preservation scheme that conformed to
rigorous privacy standards while having a high computational efficiency,
overcoming the common trade-off between privacy and computational speed.
We asserted that unless a defense scheme lowered the attack method accuracy
below 10%, it was not fully private. Using K-Means clustering as a base, we
created our own algorithm, No Data Are Alone, that accomplished this goal. Our
algorithm provided privacy at a higher level when measures against the most
robust attack methods, which relied on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN).
The attack CNN being trained on data we collected never improved in accuracy
even with training on the obfuscated data and was ever able to reach an
accuracy above 7%. Other differential privacy based defense techniques were
vulnerable to a CNN trained against them, and the CNNs trained against these
schemes had 20% or greater increases in accuracy. Additionally, the
computational cost of our scheme was less than half of the best performing
scheme.

Introduction
One of the components of MPEG-DASH that allows it to become an effective
attack surface is the reliance on variable bit-rate encoding (VBR). Bit-rate is the
amount of bits needed to encode one second of video that is sent from server to
client. VBR only sends as many bits as needed to render each segment of
video, because of this, a unique fingerprint can be made for a video.
The most effective attack based on this information uses a Convolutional Neural
Network to classify the video title. This classifier had an accuracy above 95% for
YouTube videos. Meaning an adversary can predict which video a user is
watching with 95% accuracy.
We create a defense using K-Means clustering. K-Means clustering is an
unsupervised learning algorithm that puts data similar data into groups, then
calculates the average of the data in each group. There is an average for every
group of data.

Research Question(s)
The video streaming industry is large, and video streaming is computationally
expensive, meaning it requires lots of resources from a computer. Therefore, the
main question is not only how to defend against this attack, but how can we
create a defense that maintains efficiency?

Materials and Methods
We recorded data from 40 YouTube videos 100 times each, giving us 4000 data
points to use. A graphical representation of a video recording is shown below.

Using this data, we trained a Convolutional Neural Network, to recreate the
attack so that we could test our defense scheme. We then used our own
algorithm, based on K-Means clustering, to create a new video request pattern
so that an adversary couldn’t recognize the video being watched by the user.
We created the new video pattern (an alteration of the graph above) by grouping
similar videos together, then taking the average of all the similar videos. This
average then functioned as the new video request pattern. We then tested the
attack against our defense and measured the efficiency of our defense against
the original request pattern.

Acknowledgments

Once we had our defensive scheme created, we tested the attack
against it. When testing the attack against our scheme, the attack
never reached an accuracy level above 7% when previously it had an
attack accuracy of 95% before we implemented our defense scheme.
We based our algorithm on K-Means clustering. K-Means clustering
assigns data points to a group, then computes the average for each
group. We altered the algorithm because traditional K-Means will leave
data points alone in their own group. These alone videos aren’t
private, because the average of that group would be the same as the
only data point in that group, and we used the average to create a new
video pattern.
To overcome the problem of having data along in a group, we
reassigned video so that no data points are alone in a group (cluster).
This group reassignment was not random, we calculate which group
reassignment would give the best computational efficiency and
reassign based on this. Below shows why our alteration is necessary.
As the number of groups (clusters) of data increases, there are more
data points alone in a group, and therefore the attack accuracy will
increase to a point where it is no longer private. In this graph, a value
of 0.9 represents an attack accuracy of 90%.
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